CO129-591-11 Emergency unit 1-1-1945 - 31-12-1945 — Page 38

(B) Concurrently with our efforts to provide for the attachment of a British Civil Affairs Unit to any regular troops who may operate against Cong Kong, it was agreed that e wust also consider the situation which would arise if the Colony were re-taken by guerilia troops either

a) puerilla troops claiming to owe allegiance to the Central Government or later being recognised by the Central Government or (b) communist troops not recognised by the Central Government.

(9) It we agreed that it would be useless to expoct the Generalissimo to agree to any plan providing for this latter contingency since it would be improbable that he would overtly recognise the possibility that long long would or could be captured by communist troops. Theref:ze, arteng ceseni te which we made for this exergency should referably be done without prior consultation with the Chinese Jovernment.

(10) in the other hand, the Ambassador has aade it clear and the Forcign of ice confirmed that it would not be

rooticble to evolve my secret plan (whether involving a.l.f. or not) in China since the tubessador is "completely oom:dtted to keeping General edemayor informed of all British plans and activities in the military field” and it is known that Generel Lodemwyer has placed himself under the purse comend trant with Generel Chiang Kai shek.

(11) It was agreed, therefore, that a solution to this difficulty must be found on the lines indiested in peregraph 7 of the G...'a telegram, namely by the formation of a party besed outside China. It was agreed that this would probably have to be an 2.6.3. operation and that it is desirable the Colonial Office should now approach set.š. with a

ke similar request to that put to the G..., British troope in China in er frice telegram No. 58502. If mounwhile American and Chinese agreement had been obtained to the establisboant of a straight Civil Affairs party in China, so cuch the bette

(12) The Foreign Office pointed out that if an 5.0.5. operation of this kind wining et the introduction of fritist personnel into Hong Kong to act as a rallying centre for local Chinese vare to involve "ti,hting” against Chinese guerills alsiming to one allegiance to the Central Government and thua to involve s elsoh between ourselves and our ally, China, would plsce us in an extremely emberressing situation. in the other hand, once the right of British Civil Affairs (fficers to participate in the liberation of Hong Kong had been recognised, it would be reasonable that British personnel should be introduced into liong kong by 5.5.5. if circumstances demanded and unreasonable that they should be obstructed by Chinese forces.

(13) It was agreed that the Foreign office should be kept informed and before any arrangements with 3.b.. were finolised should be given the opportunity of submitting the matter to the Chiefs of Staff and possibly the Cabinet.

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